Dialogue: The Characteristics of Information and Avoiding Surprises by Gert, Heather J. & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Dialogue: The characteristics of information and avoiding surprises 
 
By: Heather J. Gert 
 
Gert, Heather J. “Dialogue: The Characteristics of Information and Avoiding Surprises,” in Lahey Clinic  
 Medical Ethics, Winter 2003, p. 6. 
 
Made available courtesy of Lahey Clinic Foundation: http://www.lahey.org/ 
 
***Note: Figures may be missing from this format of the document 
 
 
In his article "What information should be disclosed to patients" 
1
 (Lahey Clinic Medical Ethics Newsletter, Fall 
2002). David Steinberg notes that none of the traditional standards for determining what information patients 
should receive is wholly satisfactory. Instead of these standards, Steinberg suggests that physicians consider 
eight characteristics of the information they are thinking about disclosing. 
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I agree with Steinberg that his list of characteristics can be a useful tool for thinking about when to disclose a 
certain bit of information, and that the traditional standards he discusses often don't work. I also applaud the fact 
that he would give patients more information than traditional standards require. Unfortunately, although 
consideration of his characteristics may be a useful guide, I doubt that it can serve as a standard for judging 
when withholding information is permissible. Before looking at Steinberg's suggestion, I will present my own 
principle. This is the principle of avoiding unsurprising surprises. 
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According to the principle of avoiding surprises, what physicians should aim at is not merely that patients have 
sufficient information to give (or withhold) informed consent - as traditional standards require - but at 
protecting their patients from being surprised by anything having to do with their health care situation. 
4
 So, for 
instance, patients should be told about the discomforts they'll probably experience while recovering from 
surgery. And this is so even when no one in their right mind believes that the information will affect the 
patient's treatment decision. Most people simply like to know what to expect, and this is especially true when 
they are going into situations that are already scary. 
But to demand that physicians tell patients about every possible outcome that might surprise them, no matter 
how unlikely, is to demand too much. It would also mean overloading patients with information, much of which 
physicians are certain will not actually protect them from any surprises. Therefore, if a possible outcome is so 
unlikely that the physician himself would be sincerely surprised if it occurred, then the physician isn't required 
to disclose that possibility. In short, this principle says that unless a physician would be willing to say that he 
was unprepared for a given outcome, he should ensure that his patient is prepared for it as well. 
Now let us return to Steinberg's characteristics, and compare them with my principle. His characteristics are: 1) 
relevance, 2) probability, 3) significance, 4) availability of interventions, 5) subjective need, 6) harms of telling, 
7) patient autonomy, and 8) the decision-maker's perspective. We will consider them in turn: 
We might first collapse Steinberg's first characteristic into his second. A fact is relevant insofar as it has a 
bearing on the probability that the patient will suffer a certain harm, or gain a certain bene- fit. If the director of 
a blood bank learns that the donor of a unit of blood has recently been arrested, he clearly has no obligation to 
provide the recipient of that blood with this information. This is because the information is irrelevant, and it is 
irrelevant in the sense that it has no bearing on the probability that the recipient will develop or avoid any 
medical problems. 
Of course, the principle of avoiding unsurprising surprises takes relevance and probability into account as well. 
But it also gives a reason for this: Relevance and probability are important because, among other reasons, it is 
important to help patients avoid surprises. Whether or not a physician must pass along a given bit of 
information depends on how probable it is that doing so will ensure that the patient avoids being surprised. If 
the probability is high enough that the physician would not be seriously surprised by an outcome, then she 
should give the patient that information. To use Steinberg's example, if what the director of the blood bank has 
learned is that a donor has developed Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), and he would not be surprised that CJD 
can be contracted in this way, then he is obligated to inform the donor that she may have contracted CJD. 
Significance is important as well, and this is Steinberg's third characteristic; developing a rash is less significant 
than developing CJD. But significance will also affect whether or not a patient is surprised, and how surprised 
he is. It is much more surprising to discover that you have CJD than that you have a rash. But patients are 
surprised by rashes, and should be warned of them. Thus, whereas talk of characteristics encourages us to think 
of significance as a continuum, I am inclined to see it as a threshold. If an outcome is significant enough to 
cause surprise, then the patient should be informed about it. 
One of the main reasons patients want information is so that they can use it to make informed decisions. This 
fact is reflected in Steinberg's fourth and fifth characteristics; availability of interventions and subjective need. 
In talking of subjective need, Steinberg reminds us that information about one's prognosis, what to expect 
during recovery, etc., can affect many decisions beyond those about medical interventions; the decision to 
reconcile with a family member or friend, for instance, or when to schedule an important meeting. The need to 
make decisions such as these is what Steinberg calls subjective need. 
One way of putting the gist of the principle of avoiding surprises is to say that patients often have a legitimate 
subjective need for information, even when that information will not affect any decisions in or out of the 
medical context. That is, they have a subjective need to avoid surprises. For instance, patients often feel tricked 
or betrayed when they experience unexpected pain while recovering from surgery, or even when they are 
surprised by less than pleasant aspects of hospital routine. Again, this is true even when they acknowledge that 
the information would not have affected their decision regarding treatment or any other decisions. 
The sixth characteristic Steinberg discusses is the harm that being informed might cause the patient. As with 
most other moral principles, the fact that someone might die, or be permanently disabled - and has not 
voluntarily accepted this risk - is normally overriding. So I agree that this consideration can also override the 
principle of avoiding surprises. 
Nonetheless, the fact that bad news will harm by causing anxiety does not weigh strongly against informing a 
patient. That Steinberg's seventh characteristic is autonomy hints at this, but I would stress it more strongly. He 
also notes that sometimes patients don't want information, and that in these cases autonomy requires not telling. 
This is also consistent with the principle. As with other obligations, the person to whom the obligation to inform 
is owed can waive it. So a patient can tell her physician that she waives protection from surprises, and prefers 
not to have certain information. But merely preferring not to be told is not the same as waiving the obligation to 
tell. Thus, the physician's sense that her patient does not want information is not enough to justify withholding 
it. She should get explicit permission. 
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Finally, Steinberg's eighth characteristic concerns physician-rather than patient-centered considerations. He 
notes that medical professionals working in a setting that frowns on delivering bad news will find it difficult to 
deliver such information. That is true, but the principle of avoiding surprises encourages us to criticize the 
culture of such a setting. This seems a good thing to me. As I hope it's easy to see, I agree with Steinberg that 
health care workers should take the characteristics he lists into account. But I think his suggestion is vulnerable 
to one of the same worries he expressed about the subjective (conversation) standard: it depends on the good 
will of physicians. In the odd case where a patient or ethics committee is dealing with a physician who does not 
believe that patients should be informed, a requirement to take into account characteristics is simply not 
enough. Such a physician can truly take characteristics into account and still always decide to withhold 
information. 
The principle of avoiding surprises, on the other hand, provides some recourse. This is because most of the time 
there is general agreement about which possible outcomes would be surprising. Moreover, if the patient is 
surprised, that is some - albeit inconclusive - reason to believe that the physician should have provided the 
information. Also, a physician who fails to warn a patient must be willing to say that he was unprepared for that 
outcome, and so may be open to the criticism that he should have been. Granted, there will be instances in 
which it is not clear that the physician should have been prepared for an outcome, or should have found it 
unsurprising. But these correspond with the instances in which it simply is not clear whether the physician had 
the obligation to provide that information. There are gray areas. Although Steinberg's characteristics will be 
helpful for physicians sincerely looking for guidance, my concern is that they cannot provide a standard, and 
would not allow criticism of those rare physicians who stubbornly refuse to inform their patients. 
Heather J. Gert, PhD 
Footnotes 
1
 >www.Lahey.org/Ethics/Newsletter/ Fall2002.asp 
2
 In the interest of space, I will use the term "physician." But I really have in mind health care professionals 
more generally. 
3
 Gert HJ. Avoiding surprises. A model for informing patients. Hastings Cent Rep 2002;32(5):23-32. For 
simplicity's sake, in what follows I will usually drop the "unsurprising" and refer to this as principle of avoiding 
surprises. 
4
 Steinberg does not explicitly represent these standards as specifically concerned with informed consent, but 
this is how they are usually discussed in the literature. 
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 It might even be an explicit condition of treatment or testing that a patient waive that obligation.For instance, 
testing done to detect aspecific genetic malady can result in information about paternity. Many believe that it is 
best to have an explicit policy noting that such information,collected inadvertently, will not be provided.If the 
patient freely releases the physician from this obligation, she is no longer obligated to provide the gathered 
information. 
Steinberg's reply 
Although I listed the characteristics of information I thought warranted consideration, Gert is correct in noting 
that I did not provide a standard or formula to weigh and balance those characteristics to make a disclosure 
decision. To her credit she attempts this next step. Gert does this using the notion of surprise. 
This is an intriguing but problematic solution. She is judging an action with moral content - disclosing medical 
information - by a psychological reaction. Some patients are inattentive, forgetful or prone to denial; 
information can be appropriately disclosed yet the patient will nonetheless be surprised by a disclosed event. 
Other patients have an innately pessimistic view of life and may suffer an expected, untoward event that was 
not disclosed, yet they will not be surprised because they believe that bad things happen. In both cases the 
reaction of surprise would incorrectly judge how appropriately information was disclosed. 
Physicians are also subject to the vagaries of human behavior; what surprises one physician might not surprise 
another. For the notion of surprise to be a useful concept it cannot be subject to the whims of human 
psychology. This forces us to ask the question, when should a physician be surprised? If a side effect randomly 
occurs once in every 25,000 patients who receive drug X, should the physician be surprised when it happens to 
his patient? He should not be surprised because the event is known to occur and, because it is a random event, 
there is no reason for him to believe it could not happen to one of his patients. However, the physician might be 
surprised in the way I would be surprised if I won the lottery. I know it is possible for me to win, but I'm 
surprised because I won despite long odds. If the physician should be surprised at an event that occurs once in 
every 25,000 patients, should he be surprised at an event that occurs once in 150 patients? What is the threshold 
for surprise? 
To make the notion of surprise useful, we need a developed ethics of surprise that provides the rules for 
determining when a patient or physician should be surprised. Because Gert has not yet developed this, the 
notion of surprise, although useful in many instances, cannot serve as the final arbiter of disclosure decisions. 
Some of the characteristics of information I've identified may in some cases clearly trump the others. However, 
disclosure decisions are often made within a hazy web of complex and conflicting factors. We often have to 
weigh one against the other and struggle to make the most defensible decision. I do not see a simple universal 
solution on the horizon.  
David Steinberg MD 
Chief, Section of Medical Ethics 
Lahey Clinic, Burlington, MA 
 
